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Abstract 
 
This paper traces the ‘securitisation’ of US foreign economic policy since the advent of the 
Bush administration. It does so with reference to US economic policy in East Asia.  It argues 
that in the context of US economic and military preponderance in the world order, the US has 
been unable to resist the temptation to link foreign economic and security policy.  While there 
was evidence of the securitisation of economic globalisation in US policy from day one of the 
Bush administration, it was 9/11 that firmed up this trend.  For the key members of the Bush 
foreign policy team, globalisation is now seen not simply in neo-liberal economic terms, but 
also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the United States. Economic 
globalisation is now not only a benefit, but also a ‘security problem’. 9/11 offered the 
opportunity for what we might call the ‘unilateralist-idealists’, in the Bush Administration, to 
set in train their project for a post-sovereign approach to American foreign policy. The paper 
identifies some intellectual contradictions in current US strategy and raises a series of 
questions about the implications for world order of the consolidation of the trends identified 
in the paper. 
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Introduction 
 
The relationship between globalisation, sovereignty and security is now more inextricably 
linked in the normally competing scholarly literatures of security studies and international 
political economy than at any time in the recent past. Trends in contemporary world order can 
only be understood by an examination of the changing nature of the relationship between 
sovereignty and security under conditions of economic globalisation. The context in which 
such a sweeping statement can be made is, of course, the world since 9/11.  This is not to 
suggest that the world began anew at that time. Rather it is that 9/11 brought into sharp relief 
some trends that had been developing in the global order in the closing stages of the 20th 
century.   
 
The key player in the story is, inevitably, the United States, enjoying (if that is the correct 
expression) a period of unparalleled global preponderance.  Indeed, the US controls a more 
substantial share of global power than any country since the emergence of the state system 
(Jervis, 2003). As John Ikenberry notes: 
 
‘The pre-eminence of American power today is unprecedented in modern 
history.  No other great power has enjoyed such formidable advantages in 
military, economic, technological, cultural or political capabilities.  We live in 
a one superpower world and there is no serious competitor in sight.’ 
Ikenberry, 2002: 1) 
 
Accepting Ikenberry’s assertion, the aim of this paper will be to outline the corresponding 
intellectual support system to this unprecedented American military preponderance; the 
elements of which are identified as a strange and paradoxical combination of liberal-idealist 
fundamentalism and what I call applied ‘concerted unilateralism’.  The implication of this 
combination of American ideas and contemporary power is leading to the ‘securitisation of 
globalisation’.  This argument rests on five assumptions.   
 
 The structure of world order—be it multi-polar, bi-polar or unipolar—has 
consequences for the behaviour of its key actors, especially a potentially hegemonic 
actor, in a given historical era.   
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 The current structure, by common agreement across the scholarly and policy 
spectrum, is uni-polar.   
 We are seeing the most dramatic re-interpretation of the understanding of sovereignty, 
in both theory and practice, since the birth of the Westphalian system in the 17th 
century.   
 We are also seeing a dramatic change in the economics-security nexus in foreign 
policy making.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the foreign policy of the 
world’s dominant power—the USA. 
 As a consequence, the current US Administration is ‘securitising’ the neo-liberal 
economic agenda and its foreign economic policy in the context of its changing view 
of sovereignty and security in contemporary global affairs.  
 
Borrowing, very loosely to be sure, from the Copenhagen School of security studies, I define 
securitisation as a socially constructed, contextual speech act and a process in which ‘an issue 
is framed as a security problem’ (Waever, 1995: 75, see also Buzan, et al, 1998.)1  
Specifically in this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate how elements of US foreign 
economic policy are securitised, that is subsumed or subjugated within the wider context of 
the US security agenda.  The liberal interpretation of the Copenhagen School I use thus sees 
securitisation as a process in which the securitising actors—in this case, the political 
leadership of the Bush administration, the relevant government agencies and interested 
lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al, 1988: 40)—have sought to treat economic policy 
in a manner different to the normal rules and practices of economic policy making and 
implementation.    
 
In effect, foreign economic policy is declared in need of special and differential treatment (to 
borrow a phrase from trade policy).  Securitisation, to recast Buzan et al ‘ … is the move that 
takes … [foreign economic policy] … beyond the established rules of the game and frame the 
issue as either a special kind of politics or as above politics.’ (Buzan, et al, 1998: 23)  Foreign 
economic policy under Bush, the paper will demonstrate, has come to be articulated in the 
language of security.  The audience for this re-articulation—the USA’s international 
economic partner—is made aware of the salience of the relationship between the two, 
                                                
1 For an interesting case of another policy area—transnational crime—that has undergone a process of 
securitisation in Asia see Emmers, 2003). 
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normally discursively discrete, domains of policy and the accompanying expectation that they 
respond accordingly.  The aim of securitisation is thus to justify the imposition of conditions 
and measures in the area of foreign economic policy that would not be considered the norm in 
this policy domain.  In many ways, as will be shown in the discussion of US policy towards 
trade bilateral relations with Asia, the securitisation discourse is one of reward and treat.  It is 
the exceptional circumstances of the post 9/11 war on terrorism—what the Copenhagen 
School describe as the ‘existential threat’—that has allowed the securitizing actors (the Bush 
Administration) to adopt policies and procedures extra-ordinary to the norms of the foreign 
economic policy domain. 
 
Economic globalisation, it will be argued, is now seen not simply in neo-liberal economic 
terms, but also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the United States.  
Economic globalisation is seen not only as a benefit, but also as a ‘security problem’.  While 
there was evidence of the securitisation of globalisation in US policy from day one of the 
Bush administration, it was 9/11 that firmed up this trend.  It was 9/11 that offered the 
opportunity for that group of what we might call the ‘unilateralist-idealists’, or what 
influential columnist William Pfaff (2003: 10) calls the ‘Washington Utopians’in the Bush 
Administration, to set in train their project for a new approach to American foreign policy.   
An element of this, I argue in the paper, is the privileging of security in the economics-
security nexus or what—for heuristic purposes and borrowing from the Copenhagen 
School—I have chosen to call the securitisation of economic globalisation.2 
 
The paper is in three parts.  Part 1 identifies the characteristics of a uni-polar world order in 
the early 21st century and the principal elements of a securitised foreign policy.  Part 2 traces 
the sources, and implications for policy, of the idealist-unilateralist underpinnings of 
contemporary American foreign policy.  Part 3 examines the implications of the securitisation 
of US economic foreign policy. While it is a general assertion of the paper that securitisation 
can be seen across the spectrum of US foreign economic policy interests, and most notably in 
the Middle East, this paper illustrates the argument by way of reference to contemporary US 
economic policy in East Asia.  As, relatively speaking, one of the least contentious areas of 
contemporary US foreign economic policy, this represents a strong case study with which to 
                                                
2 I wish to thank Mettke Hansen for suggesting to me the need to articulate my understanding of the 
Copenhagen School in this paper. 
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test the theoretical assertions of this paper. In conclusion, the paper identifies some 
intellectual contradictions in current US strategy and raises a series of questions about the 
implications for world order of the consolidation of the trends identified. 
 
The paper should be seen not only as a contribution to an understanding of the economics—
security nexus with specific reference to US policy in East Asia.  It should also be seen as 
part of a growing body of literature that is now trying to consolidate the essential intellectual 
linkages and synergies between political economy and security studies.  This is not the place 
to go into this issue in detail, but in the scholarly study of international relations, there has 
long existed a sharp distinction between the study of international political economy and 
security studies.  This was, in part a product of the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War 
when the bi-polar struggle dominated the academic agenda and, by extension, the policy 
agenda.   
 
But as Susan Strange (1970) noted over three decades ago, it was also explained by 
disciplinary specialisation.  International relations scholars in general, and security specialists 
in particular, ignored economics as a relevant policy area, although they did not ignore 
economics as a mode of analysis, (Higgott, 1999 and 2002). Similarly, students of political 
economy frequently ignored security concerns.   Happily, there is some evidence that this 
unnatural divide is becoming less stark.  (For a discussion see, Mastanduno, 1998 and 
Goldfischer, 2002.) 
 
 
1.  Unipolarity in the Early 21st Century 
 
International relations, especially within a realist paradigm, has a long tradition of asking 
about the state of polarity at any given time in the structure of the international system.   
There is, in the current era, a widely shared assumption (that is, not just amongst realists) that 
we are at a uni-polar, and hegemonic, moment in international affairs. As is normal with 
hegemons—from Rome to the US—they are both the source of much that is good and much 
that is bad in the world.  The crucial issue is always the balance in this relationship.  The role 
of the US in contemporary international relations and international political economy is 
currently hegemonic and unilateral in its rhetoric and behaviour that it almost blinds us to 
other views of how the world might function in a more cooperative multilateral manner.  This 
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is a polemical assertion.  I make it for two reasons.  Firstly, I happen to think that I can 
present evidence to support this position.  Secondly, it is only by contemplating this position 
that we can begin to think about strategies and policies for mitigating it.  
 
In essence, both the scholarly literature and the empirical historical evidence suggest that 
multipolarity creates incentives for economic integration and cooperation between allies and 
enhanced economic interaction as a major instrument of cooperative statecraft.  By contrast, 
bi-polarity, as during the Cold War era, encouraged the separation of economics and politics. 
The analysis of uni-polarity, often a short-lived moment is less well defined.  While resisting 
the structural realist assumptions about the independence of state power as an analytical 
variable in international relations, I am of the view that the early 21st century appears to 
confirm Michael Mastanduno’s (1998: 827) argument that a unipolar structure will see the 
hegemonic state organise economic policy and practice ‘ …  to line up behind and reinforce 
its national security strategy.’  
 
For the scholar, US policy is, at the moment, a living laboratory in which we might think 
about what motivates the relationship between the hegemonic state and its economic and 
security policies.  While security issues and state power, especially military preponderance, is 
clearly important, there are also other salient factors. As the paper will suggest—ideational 
influences (a presently dominant neo-conservative ideology) and the changing nature of neo-
liberal economic globalisation—are also salient in explaining US behaviour. More 
immediately, a sense of historical context is required.  As Jervis (2003: 83) argues, ‘nations 
enjoying unrivalled power, always define their national interest in increasingly expansive 
terms. 
 
US policy has been very much constituted by where the USA stands in either a bi-polar, 
multi-polar or uni-polar historical moment.  In historical terms this is reflected in US policy 
in the Cold War and post Cold War eras. During the bi-polar Cold War the major security 
rival, the USSR was not the major economic rival.  The West and East were effectively 
separate economic entities (see Spero, 1976).  In this context, the US strongly separated 
economic and security policy. In the economic domain—especially through the Marshall 
Plan, its encouragement of the development of a free trade area in Europe and other actions—
US economic strategy was to rebuild its allies, and indeed former military rivals (Japan and 
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German) in a way that reflected a complementary Western economic order but a competitive 
East-West security divide.   
 
As a reading of the late 1980s and early 1990s attests, Cold War tensions declined, the Soviet 
Empire came to an end and economic competition between the US and its politico-strategic 
partners increased.  This was also to be a period of heightened economic tension between the 
US and Europe across the Atlantic and the US and Japan across the Pacific (see Albert, 1992; 
Prestowitz, 1998; Garten, 1992; Thurow, 1999.)  Economic growth in Europe and Asia was 
such that US economic primacy, and indeed, the Anglo-American way of organising a 
capitalist economy, appeared to be challenged.  Tense relations were reflected in a range of 
policies that saw the economics-security nexus in foreign policy becoming more blurred than 
it had been during the era of heightened Cold war bi-polarisiation (Mastanduno, 1988: 829-
43). 
 
This was to change further by the late 1990s.  The US had enjoyed a decade of steady growth, 
the high tech boom was in full flight and the Asian Economic Miracle had run out of steam—
across the board, stagnation in Japan, financial crisis in other parts of Asia—the ‘miracle’ 
was pronounced dead.  The atmospherics of the US-Asia relationship had seen the Asian 
hubris of the early 1990s give way to American schadenfreude in the late 1990s (see Higgott, 
1998 and Zuckerman, 1999). US preponderance was firmly established—unipolarity seemed 
to be more than just a moment.  The stated desire of both the late Clinton and early Bush 
Administrations to preserve preponderance has led to the greater harmonisation of economics 
and security considerations in US policy.  The important point to note is that this trend was in 
place prior to 9/11.  Without elaboration at this stage, this shift had been evident in relations 
towards Europe and Asia—and China in particular. 
 
In short, there would appear to be a correlation between the degree of dominance of the 
international system by the US in military terms and the manner in which it uses economic 
policy as an arm of security policy. The emergence of uni-polarity and the close integration 
of economic and security policy arguably has its origins back in the mid 1990s (especially 
after that series of financial crises that hit Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe and Latin America).  
But, as the next section will argue it was 9/11 that offered the unilateralist idealists 
(epitomised in the New American Century Project) to set in train their agenda for a post 
sovereign approach to American foreign policy. 
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From a reading of US policy in the contemporary era, we can say that a unipolar moment 
does indeed appear to have tempted the hegemon to integrate economic and security policy 
more closely than under conditions of multi-polarity.  It has done so in a manner in which 
economic policy has become an arm of security policy.  Economic policy, rather than being a 
mere instrument of economic relations and statecraft becomes a part of the armoury of 
influence that the hegemon uses to develop a strategy towards potential challengers.  At the 
general level, this can be seen in US policy towards the international economic institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank and especially in policy towards the WTO in the current 
Doha.  It can also be seen in its bilateral economic relations; for example, with the EU.  The 
nexus between economic and security relations with the EU are now an integral part of its 
wider security agenda in the wake of the split with continental Europe over military 
involvement in Iraq.   As the empirical discussion in part 3 will demonstrate, economic 
relations with East Asia have also been ‘securitised’. 
 
The Economics-Security Nexus 
 
For students of the political economy of globalisation on the one hand, or security studies on 
the other, the economics security-nexus is not always an easy relationship to work out.  
Indeed, it is often confused, always problematic. Thus it is important to distinguish between 2 
aspects of this relationship in order to understand what is happening in US policy in the 
contemporary era: 
 
 The subordination of economic policy to security policy— in which foreign 
economic policy supports wider politco-military policy in the international domain.  
This is the traditional understanding of the relationship between high politics and low 
politics. It would also be the traditional view from Defence establishments of the 
right balance in the relationship. 
  The subordination of security policy to economic interests— From the point of view 
of the prevailing hegemonic power, this approach is replete with assumptions about 
the need only to make the world safe for the liberal economic enterprise.   
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The second relationship, the subordination of security policy to economic policy, was the 
dominant characteristic of the US policy in the late 20th century, that is the era neo-liberal 
globalisation proper; basically that period from the time of détente and the collapse of the 
Soviet empire through to the financial crises of the second half of the 1990s.  But it is first 
relationship, the subordination of economic policy to security policy, which has become more 
prominent since the late Clinton/early Bush era, with massive accentuation following 9/11.  
The change of direction—towards the securitisation of economic policy—is to be explained 
in both ideational and material ways.  Three factors are worth noting:   
 
1. It came about via the political economy of US foreign policy in the late 20th/early 21st 
centuries and especially the seemingly paradoxical juxtaposition of the consolidation 
of US economic primacy after the financial crises of the second half of the 1990s with 
the increasingly fractious and contested debate over the management of the global 
economic system as captured in the shift from the Washington Consensus to the post 
Washington consensus era and the growing backlash against globalisation after 
Seattle, 1999.  
2. It came about via the change of administration and the arrival of a different 
ideological tradition in charge of US foreign policy. 
3. It was consolidated after 9/11 with the declaration of war against terrorism. 
 
All three factors are germane to this paper. There is already a large literature on the backlash 
against globalisation (see Higgott, 2000 for a review).  It is factors 2 and 3, the arrival of the 
‘unilateralist idealists’ and the impact of 9/11 that have coalesced to see a major change in 
our understanding of the notion of sovereignty in contemporary international relations. They 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
2.  Explaining Contemporary American Foreign Policy: Liberal Internationalism 
and Unilateralism 
 
There are perhaps two useful routes into an explanation of US foreign policy.  One is to 
examine the history and rhetoric of US foreign policy traditions.  The second is to look at 
contemporary practice.  This dualistic approach allows for a demonstration of the 
consistencies and the disconnect that exist between some strong beliefs on the one hand and 
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the practice of a hegemonic foreign policy, persently untrammelled by few constraints on the 
other.    
 
There is undoubtedly a view in the US, unquestioned since the end of the Cold War—or more 
appropriately since what is seen as the US victory in the Cold War—that a new system 
should be advanced by the US to replace the bi-polar structures.  This view is captured, 
without a trace of irony or doubt (characteristics often absent in contemporary US foreign 
policy) in the title of Michael Mandelbaum’s book, Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, 
Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (2001). These ideas—peace as a 
method of organising international relations, democracy as the optimal form of government 
and free markets as a way to structure economic life—are the central rhetorical core of 
contemporary American idealism.  But most explicitly, this mood is captured in George 
Bush’s own words at a West Point Graduation Ceremony (Bush, 2002) and in the recent 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002).  These two documents 
provide the blueprint for the paradox that is current US foreign policy; what Edwards Rhodes 
(2003) describes as ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’.   
 
This is not the place for an historical discussion of the traditions running through American 
foreign policy (but see Mead, 2002).  But there are basically two lines of contest that 
permeate its foreign policy tradition.  Adapting a now well-worn classification (developed by 
Holsti and Rosenau, 199) and, more recently by Hassner and Vaisse, 2003) the contemporary 
period can be schematised in matrix form.  On a horizontal axis we can identify the 
objectives in which we have a tradition running from idealism to realism.  On a vertical axis 
we can identify a tradition running from multilateralism to unilateralism.    Much store is set 
by trying to pick difference between the right and the left, or the hard and the soft in the Bush 
administration (Rumsfield and Wolfowitz versus Powell?)  Names could be substituted or 
moved around the boxes in a security studies version of ‘fantasy football’.  Such niceties are 
the stuff of media debate.  The real distinction in the current administration is between the 
idealist-unilateralists and the realist-unilateralists. (Boxes 4 and 3 respectively) 
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The Philosophical Objectives of US Foreign Policy 
 
 Idealism Realism 
Multilateralism Box 1 
Liberal Internationalists 
Joseph Nye 
Al Gore 
Bill Clinton 
Box 2 
Realist Managers 
Henry Kissinger 
Zbigniew Brezeinski 
Lawrence Eagleburger 
 
 
M 
E 
A 
N 
S 
Unilateralism Box 4 
Neo-Conservatives/ 
Post-Sovereignists 
New American Century 
Paul Wolfowitz 
Robert Kagan 
William Kristol 
Box 3 
Isolationists/Sovereignists 
Pat Buchanan 
The American Cause and 
The American Conservative
 
Influenced by the New American Century Project (see its statement of principles at 
http://www.newamericancentury.org), the idealist-unilateralists (Box 4) argue that, in the 
absence of a better alternative and few constraints on its behaviour, the USA should develop 
a Pax Americana.  This should be global in scope and would aim to create a world that 
accepts and/or acquires American values.  The essence of this view is captured in several key 
concepts—regime change for failed or rogue states, war against terrorism, nation-building 
etc—that Skidelsky nicely describes as the ‘linguistic basis of an imperial ideology’ 
(Skidelsky, 2003: 3).  This language distinguishes between good and evil and rejects moral 
relativism.   
 
George Bush makes it very easy for the world to understand his position. America has a 
‘moral duty’ to create  ‘a balance of power that favors freedom’ (Washington Post, 27 
October, 2002).  Things are either black or white.  Grey is not a colour George Bush likes.  
As Rhodes (2003: 134) argues: America’s global military power allows it to dictate the rules 
of international discourse’ and this is not an ambivalent discourse open to negotiation.  As 
Bush told a the 2002 West Point graduates: 
 
The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based 
on non-negotiable demands for human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the 
power of the state, respect for women and private property, and free speech and 
equal justice and religious tolerance. … When it comes to the rights and needs 
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of men and women, there is no clash of civilisations.  The requirements of 
freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world’ 
(Bush, 2002: 4-5.) 
 
This language is symptomatic of a desire—present in US foreign policy since the time of 
Woodrow Wilson and now finding full voice in the Bush Adminstration—to underwrite 
American security by bringing order the post-colonial world.   Bush sees the role of the USA 
as not simply to defend liberalism and freedom in America but to expand these benefits to 
others.  Sovereignty cannot be used as a shield for corrupt and ruthless governments to thwart 
its people’s aspirations for liberalism and freedom.  As the National Security Agenda says ‘no 
nation owns these aspirations and no nation is exempt from them’ (US Government, 2002: 3). 
The imperial—or post sovereign—element of this strategy was not present in Bush’s foreign 
policy agenda when he was running for President in 2000.  Indeed, the agenda then was to 
avoid foreign entanglements (see Rice, 2000), deterrence and containment were the order of 
the day prior to taking office.   
 
But this more conservative agenda has now been shelved for more a more assertive—indeed 
pre-emptive—posture that we can characterise as ‘post sovereigntist’.  As an intimation of 
change, this position is as dramatic as it sounds.  Indeed, as Robert Skidelsky (2003: 30) 
notes, ‘the system of international relations we have known since the second world was has 
broken down’.  For him, ‘ … the doctrine of national sovereignty is in crisis with no 
alternative system of global economic management to take its place.  The significance of the 
invasion of Iraq—following on the heels of interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan—is that we have no coherent or consistent set of rules for what constitutes 
lawful military interventions in the contemporary order.   
 
In short the bedrock assumptions of sovereignty, as we have known them for much of the 
post-Westphalian era—the centre of authority, the origin of law and the source of individual 
and collective security within designated boundaries that distinguished the domesticated 
interior from the anarchical exterior—are challenged by the notion of pre-emption at the heart 
of the modern Bush Doctrine.  This is not for one minute to suggest that sovereignty has 
previously been an absolute, manageable and uncontested concept, or that sovereignty could 
ever be equated with an equal form of independence for all states in anything other than the 
most narrow of legal interpretations. Nor is it to deny that substantial inroads have been made 
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into the capacity of states to make autonomous economic policy.  Clearly, the power of 
markets—under conditions of global liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and hollowing 
out of government—has grown at the expense of the authority of states.   
 
In short, sovereignty has always been a relative, relational and, indeed, hypocritical concept.  
But as even an arch a sceptic as Stephen Krasner noted in the subtitle of his book on 
Sovereignty, it was at least Organised Hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999; but see also Walker, 1993 
and Spruyt, 1994) that gave us some rules around which to organise the development of inter-
state relations and create a system of norms, principles, rules and institutions above and 
beyond, or ‘outside’ the state.   
 
The more radical post-sovereign liberal order envisaged by the Bush Administration will be 
under written by American military power, not the collective approval of a wider liberal 
community.  As the National Security Strategy makes clear ‘While the United States will 
constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to 
act alone…’ (US Government 2002: 6)  As Rhodes (2003: 136) notes, ‘America’s sovereign 
responsibilities supersede its commitment to international institutions.’   This is not, of 
course, new.  While the US has a history of pragmatic involvement in the development of 
specific international institutions, there has always been a sub-conscious ambivalence in the 
US attitudes towards multilateralism. This is sometimes explained by the notion of American 
‘exceptionalism’ of which one of the core beliefs of political leaders is that conducting 
foreign policy through international institutions is but one option among many rather than 
that there might be any sense of obligation to operate in this manner.  (Luck, 2003: 27) This 
view would seem to lay behind US attitudes to the UN in the 21st century.  Again in 
Skidelsky’s words: 
 
‘[T]he doctrine of national sovereignty is in retreat … article 51 of the UN 
charter has been replaced in US strategic thinking by a potentially unlimited 
doctrine of ‘’pre- emptive action’’.  This means that the UN charter is no 
longer binding n its most powerful member. But what is binding?   Is 
anything binding?’ (2003: 31). 
 
The language of the unilateralist idealists is to be contrasted with that of the isolationist 
realists (Box 3).  The isolationist realists reject the Wilsonian impulse in favour of the 
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Jacksonian call to resist what they see as idealist interventionism.  They would withdraw 
troops from overseas deterrence bases and re-instate protectionist measures.  In its most 
extreme forms—for example Pat Buchanan’s journal, The American Conservative and the 
American Cause web-site—the isolationist position calls for withdrawal from all global 
organisations that ‘threaten American sovereignty’, an end to financial support to the IMF 
and the World Bank, withdrawal of ground troops from Europe and Asia and no new 
membership of security organisations such as NATO. 
 
In a wider longer-term historical and conceptual context, these differences between idealist-
unilateralists and realist unilateralists actually have little meaning for the observed conduct of 
contemporary US foreign policy.  Although the contemporary position in US foreign policy is 
more clearly dominated now, than at any time since WWII, by the idealists, what they have in 
common with the isolationists is their unilateralist urge. Both see multilateral dialogue as a 
constraint on American interests and action. It is this commonality that is the crucial element 
of contemporary American foreign policy for this paper. 
 
The multilateralists—be they idealists (see Nye 2002) or the realist managers (see Kissinger 
2001)—have little influence over US foreign policy in the contemporary era.  Indeed, until 
there is a change of Administration in Washington it is unlikely that Joseph Nye’s perpetual 
plea for the United States to harness its ‘soft power’ is likely to go unheeded.   In the 
meantime, the language of Bush foreign policy is replete with the pro-active rhetoric of 
Wilsonian democratic imperialism.   
 
The argument of the unilateralist idealist finds its fullest articulation in contemporary US 
policy in Iraq.  (See Dodge 2003a: xii-xix and 2003b). But the removal of Saddam Hussein 
should be seen as but one episode in a wider agenda for a world the US ‘seeks to create’ and 
the manner in which it proposes to undertake this task (Rhodes, 2003: 132). It is the context 
within which the securitisation of economic policy should be viewed.    As exhibited in the 
adventure into Iraq, a fear of US foreign policy is that the burden of consensus building will 
constrain it from acting freely in the pursuit of its stated ideals of promoting democracy, 
human rights and free trade.   
 
Unilateral action, backed by American military power, is the modus operandi to be adopted.  
At this stage, we do not yet know the degree to which US staying power will back up this 
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rhetoric.  But failing to live up to expectations will only reinforce that already strong stream 
of cynicism that greets American motives in many parts of world opinion (see Prestowitz, 
2003:1-14).  In short, while the rhetoric is idealist, we have yet to see whether the practice 
will remain so, or whether the realist instinct to privilege the defence of US interest in the 
international system, without actually changing the system, will re-occur as it has done in 
times in past.  
 
While much of this is understood in the context of US security policy proper, perhaps less 
well articulated are the contours of this unilateralist urge in the wider reaches of US foreign 
policy; for example, as they have accompanied a changing US attitude towards economic 
globalisation. What we are seeing is what I would call the ‘securitisation’ of globalisation.  
By this I mean that US policy towards broader issues in the global economy are being 
subjugated to the imperatives of the security agenda. As one of the most articulate spokesmen 
for the foreign policy of the Bush Administration has noted ‘ … globalisation is not just 
economic.  It is also a political and security phenomenon … we cannot turn our backs on 
conflicts and the violation of human rights in other countries if we want to be secure.’ (Tony 
Blair, cited in Skidelsky, 2003: 32) The new doctrine re-defines, indeed does away with, the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.  This is a key element 
in the Wilsonian crusade. 
 
An Emerging Dissent? 
 
Recent changes in US positions, policies and behaviour on the key issues of economic 
globalisation, especially its increasingly unilateralist attitude towards the reform of the key 
instruments of international economic management (the WTO, IMF and World Bank) and 
especially following the Asian financial crises, are now as well understood (see Stiglitz, 
2002) as are other aspects of its unilateral behaviour (such as walking away from the Kyoto 
Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Germ Weapons Ban and Trade in Light Arms 
Treaty.)  What is less well articulated is the degree to which these policies do in fact represent 
a historical break with the past. 
 
In a previous uni-polar moment—in the aftermath of World War Two—the USA used its 
unchallenged power (material and ideational) to set in place an international institutional 
infrastructure of global economic management. Although under written by US hegemony, the 
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Bretton Woods System and the GATT were multilateral in both tone and practice.  For sure, 
the USA saw these institutions as beneficial to its national interest and its view of world 
order, but it defined its interests broadly and in a sufficiently inclusive manner that other 
countries felt able, nay keen, to sign on to a vision that stressed the importance of due process 
and the rule of law.   
 
Now, in another uni-polar moment, there is a strong sense that the USA is defining national 
interest much more narrowly, largely in security terms, and turning its back on institutional 
arrangements that for half a century were at the base of its moer multilateral view of world 
order.  My point here is not to make judgements on the contemporary utility of the major 
international institution—that they are in need of major reform is not the issue—rather I wish 
to capture the magnitude of the change that US policy has undergone since the advent of the 
Bush administration.  Moreover, the notion that what is on offer here is purely an anti-
American critique to be found only amongst activist NGOs and Civil Society Organisation, in 
the non-representative European press of marginal influence such as The Guardian or Le 
Monde or the left professoriate, needs to be quickly dispatched.  
 
In the context of what we would normally understand as neo-liberal economic globalisation, 
current American unilateralist foreign policy runs counter to the interests of major sections of 
the American politico-economic establishment.  Three examples of this view from 
impeccably credentialed pro-American, and influential, sources can serve to illustrate this 
point.  
 
 Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by much American 
capitalism.  It finds strong voice within the core of the US corporate community.  For 
example, Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale Business School and a former 
Undersecretary for Commerce and Trade and representative of the liberal globalist 
wing of US capital has gone on record as saying that this is a foreign policy harmful 
not only to US business in particular, but to the health of economic globalisation in 
general.  As he has noted (Business Week, October 14, 2002: 74-6) ‘Unilateralism 
imperils global economic stability’.  
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 Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by important sections of 
what we might call the ‘global economic managerial elite’. For example, Peter 
Sutherland, last director-general of the GATT, Chairman of Goldmann-Sacks, Co-
Chair of the Trilateral Commission (no America-phobe he) has argued that, ‘ … [the 
USA] … no longer seems committed to the multilateralism … [it] … did so much to 
foster’ (cited in Prestowitz, 2003: 9). 
 
 Contemporary US unilateral policy is identified and resisted by important sections of 
the influential US policy wonk community.  We can ignore obvious venues of 
democratic-minded critique from bodies such as Brookings, the Council of Foreign 
Relations and the Carnegie Endowment.  However, it is less easy to ignore the 
position of think tankers such as Clyde Prestowitz, who provides a comprehensive 
check list of the manner in which the USA has shifted from a multilateral to a 
unilateral position on a range of key foreign economic policy issues (2003: 1-17).  
This is an amazing book to be penned by the President of a major conservative 
Washington based think tank (the Economic Strategy Institute) and erstwhile 
prominent economic nationalist ‘Japan basher’ of the late 1980s. The thrust of 
Prestowitz’s argument is captured in the title of his book, Rogue Nation: American 
Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.   
 
But one significant element of the sources of critique of contemporary US foreign economic 
policy lies in its weakness.  It currently has very little influence. The dominance of the 
unilateralist idealists over the policy process is to the almost complete exclusion of other 
voices.  An ‘ideas battle’ might exist in the US intellectual community, but it is a battle that 
currently takes place only on the margins of the contemporary policy process.  The real 
battle—which is being comprehensively won by the unilateralist idealists—is the 
implementation battle. 
 
 
3.  The Implications of Securitisation 
 
The ascendancy of the unilateral idealists and the securitisation of US globalisation 
policies—that is over key elements of its foreign economic policy—can be found in a number 
of empirical contexts. It is the contention of this section of the paper that US policy towards 
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the Asian regional agenda is significantly shaped by the influences outlined in parts 1 and 2 
of the paper.  At one level it is inevitable that the reassertion of the geo-security agenda over 
the geo-economic agenda (that prevailed in the 1990s heyday of neo-liberal globalisation) 
should result in policy change.  Moreover, the weakened US economy (which is not a 
contradiction with the argument that we live in a unipolar hegemonic moment) since the 
collapse of the high tech boom has seen the Administration think more about the degree to 
which the security agenda could also be a prop to the domestic economy, even prior to 9/11.  
 
On this reading of US policy in the contemporary era, the uni-polar moment would appear to 
have tempted the hegemon to adopt a stronger unilateralist posture and to integrate economic 
and security policy more closely than had been the case under conditions of multi-polarity. 
We are witnessing a ‘securitisation’ of economic policy; that is, the process by which 
economic policy is framed as a security question.  Globalisation is now seen not simply 
through rose tinted neo-liberal economic lenses, but also through the less rosy coloured lenses 
of the national security agenda of the US.  Specifically, economic globalisation is seen not 
only as an economic benefit, but also as a security ‘problem’.  In the context of New Security 
Agenda, economic policy becomes an explicit arm of security policy.  Rather than being a 
mere instrument of economic relations and statecraft it becomes a part of the armoury of 
influence that the US is using to develop a strategy towards potential challengers.  This trend 
can be seen in across the spectrum of US economic policy:  
  
 In its responses towards the neo-liberal economic globalisation project in general. 
 In policies towards the international economic institutions (the IMF, the World Bank) 
and especially towards the WTO in the Doha MTN round.   
 In bilateral economic relations.  For example, with the EU, where the nexus between 
economic and security relations is now an integral part of its wider security agenda in 
the wake of the split over military involvement in Iraq. 
 Finally, in its relations towards Asia.   
 
While policy towards Asia is the empirical case study of this paper it is worth offering a brief 
insight into the other elements of policy.  
 
 20
Neo-Liberal Globalisation:  Contrary to some of the more pietistic beliefs that prevailed in 
the 1990s hyper-globalist literature (quintessentially see Ohmae, 1990; Schwartz and Leiden, 
1998) globalisation does not eliminate more traditional understandings of inter-state 
competition between the major powers.   Nor does it eliminate competition between various 
sectors of the ruling economic elites of the major powers.  As Marxists, and indeed many 
non-Marxists, would argue, the interests of ‘capital’ can be expected to split between sections 
of it which are global and sections which are more nationalist in character.  In the USA, the 
prime example of that section of capital that is more nationalist than global is what is often 
referred to as the ‘military industrial complex’.  Indeed, the struggle for representation 
between global and national fractions of US capital has existed for some time.   
 
In the early-mid 1990s, what we might call the heyday of the global neo-liberal prior to the 
beginning of the anti-globalisation backlash, global capital received substantial support from 
the US administration.  To give one example, Clinton’s support of a strong dollar policy to 
ensure re-stimulation of Germany and Japan—the largest markets for the growing US service 
industries—was the kind of policy one would expect from a genuinely neo-liberal 
globalisation perspective. By contrast, the Bush administration has shown itself to be more 
nationalist than neo-liberal in its attitudes towards the drivers of economic globalisation and, 
as I suggest below, the institutions of global economic governance.  Its policies are geared to 
re-booting the US economy at the expense of others.  This can be seen, for example, in 
manner of the decline in value of the US dollar against the Euro. While the US government 
would clearly resist this assertion, the 25% depreciation in under two years should not be read 
merely as a purely market driven correction.  Rather, as Walden Bello notes (Bangkok Post, 
June 19, 2003), it should be seen as part of an implicit strategy, beggar thy neighbour style, to 
enhance US competitiveness. In short, policies geared towards controlling globalisation, 
unlike in the more laissez faire period of the last decades of the 20th century when the market 
alone was meant to drive it—have a much stronger place in US policy under the Bush 
Administration.   
 
The International Institutions: In this domain, as in many other areas, the Bush 
administration is, at best, ambivalent towards instruments of multilateral global economic 
governance.   For example, the WTO is now seen as a site at which it cannot always be 
guaranteed to secure its own way.  There are two reasons for this.  Firstly, this is the one 
international institutional arena where collective European power is closer to par with the US.  
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The EU, impressively and in contrast to many other areas of policy, speaks and acts with one 
voice in the WTO.   
 
Secondly, the creation of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) developed during the 
Uruguay Round and enshrined in the WTO applies to the US as much as any other state.  
There is a strong feeling in large quarters of the US trade policy community that in signing on 
to the WTO/DSM—effectively swapping its aggressive unilateralist trade policy of the 1970s 
and 1980s for the ‘multilateral assertiveness’ of the DSM—the US had failed to appreciate 
the manner in which the constraints of the DSM would bite it as much as, if indeed not more, 
than other WTO contracting parties (for a discussion see Elliott and Hufbauer, 2002: 404-7).   
 
Indeed, the US has lost several disputes under the new dispute settlement system, and the last 
few years, basically since the abortive Seattle Ministerial Meeting of 1999, has seen a 
growing hostility to the WTO in US policy circles.  This is the case not only among the 
isolationist-unilateralist, but also amongst the unilateralist idealists.  This represents change 
overtime.  Historically, US commitments to multilateralism have always been stronger in the 
economic domain than any other area of policy.  But in what has been a continual tension 
between unilateralism and ultilateralism the unilateralist urge is gaining the upper hand once 
again.  The US’s rhetorical commitment to a successful Doha Round must be contrasted with 
its increasing recourse to bilateral free trade, or more accurately preferential trade, 
agreements.  This issue is discussed in detail in the examination of policy towards Asia.   
 
Given the differences in their institutional structure and decision-making process—especially 
the system of weighted voting which gives the US an effective veto—US control in the IMF 
and the World Bank is more assured than at the WTO.  In these instances, it is easier to 
secure more self-serving policy outcomes—as in the veto of an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 
and more recently in its stifling of IMF Chief Economist and First Deputy Managing Director 
(Anne Krueger) suggested strategy to improve the management and regularisation of 
developing country sovereign debt restructuring (for a description of the proposals see Fisher 
and Krueger, 2003).  The proposal was opposed by US banks and subsequently blocked by 
the US Treasury. 
 
Europe: For the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, US support for the closer 
economic integration of the European continent is less than unequivocal.  As US security 
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specialist Christopher Layne recently noted, US policy towards the Atlantic alliance has 
changed.  During the Cold War, the aim of NATO was, to resurrect an old phrase‘… to keep 
the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in’.  Now, trans-Atlantic relations for 
the USA are ‘ … about staying on top and keeping the Europeans apart’. (Financial Times, 
August 13, 2003: 11).  To be sure, US support for closer European integration was never 
about creating an equal partner to the USA.  It was OK while it was within the framework of 
a US dominated Atlantic relationship.  But this is less the case now.   There are both long-
term changes and short-term explanations for the change in attitude on the part of the US. 
 
In the longer term, it is clear that there has been an erosion of the common stock of values 
shared by the US and Europe.  One does not have to accept the more apocalyptic explanation 
for this erosion—pace Robert Kagan’s (2003) somewhat hysterical description of Americans 
from Mars and Europeans being from Venus—to recognise that there are substantive and 
deep areas of disagreement across the Atlantic.  William Wallace (2002: 145-6), in more 
sober fashion, describes how the EU and the US have a different view of key aspects of the 
relationship on questions of ‘burden sharing’, ‘partnership’, so-called US ‘exceptionalism’ 
(read superiority), and indeed approaches to global economic management overall. 
 
More immediately, the relationship has been tested by the war in Iraq and the introduction of 
less than subtle divide and rule tactics into US policy towards Europe.  These are to be found 
most publicly, but not only, in Donald Rumsfeld’s expressed desires for a ‘new’ Europe—
from amongst the countries of the old Warsaw Pact—to provide the US with a counterweight 
to the tiresome ‘old’ Europe, with France and Germany at its heart.  While not directly 
germane to the argument advanced in this paper, as recent survey material shows, this is 
likely to prove a misreading of ‘new European’ opinion by Rumsfeld.  New Europe might be 
pro-American, but on all public policy issues, save the fight against terrorism, it is first and 
foremost pro-European (see europa.eu.int/comm./public_opinion/cceb_en.htm).  A new, 
larger European union will be more diverse, but new Europe is not simply joining the EU to 
become an American Trojan horse.  For the accession states, the priority is the consolidation 
of their position within the greater European area. 
 
Asia:  Hubs and Spokes all the Way down:  US economic relations with East Asia have also 
been ‘securitised’.  This can be seen within the regional institutions and especially in bilateral 
economic relations.  Even prior to 9/11, Asian observers had increasingly evaluated APEC as 
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a tool of American foreign policy.  APEC’s failure to provide any meaningful response to the 
biggest economic crisis in the Asia-Pacific region since 1945 (the financial crises of the 
second half of the 1990s) made it, if not irrelevant, then less important, for many Asian 
members.  Resistance of Asian policy makers to a strengthened APEC after the financial 
crisis was caused not only by the lack of tangible benefits but also by a fear of American 
dominance within the organisation (Kahler, 2000: 568).  APEC has always struggled to 
reconcile its regional focus with the wider agendas of the US and its problems go deeper 
(Ravenhill, 2000.)  APEC’s concentration on facilitating contacts in the corporate and private 
sector, accompanied by an almost total neglect of developing an intra-regional network at the 
wider civil society level, has resulted in a weak or non-existent sense of community.  As a 
consequence, it fails to provide much political legitimacy for the wider regional neo-liberal 
economic project. 
 
Most immediately, the manner in which the US has treated APEC in the wake of 9/11 has 
confirmed Asian perceptions. Throughout the 1990s, the Asia Pacific had been a major focus 
of attention for US foreign economic policy. It was an important part of its neo-liberal global 
economic agenda, evinced by its (albeit failed) attempt to use APEC to secure Early 
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation (EVSL) (Aggarwal and Ravenhill, 2001.)  Following 9/11, 
US interests in regions of the world other than the Middle East and the war on terrorism were 
placed firmly on the back burner.  Policy began to reflect a declining American concern for 
the viability of an issue-specific organisation such as APEC if it does not contribute towards 
US policy on the privileged issues of the containment of terrorism.    
 
Nothing illustrates the point better than the 2001 Shanghai and 2002 Mexico APEC summits, 
at both of which most Asian leaders felt the agenda hi-jacked by President Bush to galvanise 
support against the war on terrorism in general and support for the military coalition against 
Iraq in particular.   Few of the Asian leaders present in Mexico doubted Bush’s contention 
that terrorism and economic development were linked, but most felt that the balance, with its 
over-riding focus on security, was wrong for APEC.  But this approach, if the central 
proposition of this paper is accepted is in keeping with the increasing securitisation of US 
economic policy.   
 
Rivalry between an Asian integration project and APEC is, of course, not new and not all 
questioning of APEC’s continued utility stems from current American policy.  Independently 
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of the position of the US towards APEC, policy elites in Asia have been reconsidering the 
benefits of regionalism without the Pacific Caucasians. In particular, American opposition to 
an Asian Monetary Fund in, and since, 1997 (for a discussion see Wang, 2000) has sewed the 
seeds for further polarisation and bolstered the development of a dialogue between Southeast 
and Northeast Asia on this and other issues.  Since the turn of the century, regular ASEAN 
summits have been expanded by the participation of Japan, China and South Korea in 
ASEAN+3 (or APT) meetings. Steps in the search for a new monetary regionalism have been 
have been numerous. (For a discussion see Dieter and Higgott, 2003)   
 
Does this represent a ‘new regionalism’ in East Asia without a central role for the USA? It is 
too early to tell.  If not a new regionalism then it may at least reflect a ‘new realism’ on the 
part of Asian leaders in the wake of the financial crises of the 1990s and other 
contemporaneous changes in regional mood.  Irrespective of the explanations of the Asian 
financial crises, the closing years of the 20th century convinced Asian regional policy elites, 
as even some influential Americans noted, that, ‘…they no longer want to be in thrall to 
Washington or the West when trouble hits in’ (Bergsten 2000, 20.) Bergsten, with Nobel 
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2002) are rare amongst American observers in recognising the 
degree to which East Asian states felt that they were ‘both let down and put upon by the 
West’ in the crisis and that a more purpose designed, specifically East Asian, response to 
certain policy issues was neither uninteresting nor unreasonable in the circumstances.  The 
point for this paper is that the US, since 9/11, has been largely disinterested in Asia specific 
regionally inspired cooperative initiatives in a manner that would have been hard to envisage 
in the closing years of the 20th century. 
 
Asian concerns were also a reflection of the destabilising effect on the international trade 
agenda of the enhanced unilateral character of US policy that has accompanied the election of 
the Bush Administration.  While the rhetoric of the market remains strong, the impact of 
politics on markets is never far away.  Nowhere is this better seen in US policy than in the 
relationships between the US government’s rhetorical support for the multilateral trade 
regime on the one hand and practice towards trade policy on the other.  The imposition of 
emergency tariffs in ‘sensitive US sectors’—on steel imports and increased agricultural 
subsidies in the Farm Bill in 2001—when accompanied by the constant American hectoring 
of Japan, Korea and Europe to end protection and subsidies to their sensitive sectors 
highlights the marked disconnect between rhetoric and practice of US trade policy.  So too 
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does the current US interest in bilateral trading relationships which is now a key element of 
trade policy in Asia.   
 
For sure, the interest in bilateral trade arrangements is determined by a number of factors.  
Specifically, the Doha MTN Round is not going well.  It is in trouble for many reasons that 
cannot be discussed here (but see Lehmann, 2003).  But there can be little doubt that the 
growing US unilateral policies and its interest in bilateral preferential trading relationships 
(PTAs) is one of the major reasons.  At the very least, it gives cause to doubt the priority that 
the US accords to securing a successful MTN round.  In trenchant form, even by his 
standards, Bhagwati argues that the US has taken its eye of the multilateral ball.  It has, as he 
says: 
 
‘ … frittered its attention on piffling bilaterals that threaten the multilateral 
system in ways that the energetic US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick 
astonishingly will not recognise.’ (Bhagwati, 2003: 10) 
 
This interest is not, it should be said, simply a US phenomenon.  But, if the Europeans started 
it, and other, smaller and weaker states are now also exploring it, is the zeal with which the 
interest in bilateral activities has been picked up by the US that is the major cause for 
concern.  The role of the US, as the strongest partner in any bilateral relationship, is bound to 
be disproportionately influential.  The US is in a position to use its hegemonic power and the 
prospect of preferential access to the US market (Bhagwati and Panagiriya, 2003: 13).  The 
proliferation of bilateral PTAs is also, we can note, the issue on which the biggest divide 
between settled economic theory and short-term political practice can be seen in the global 
economy since the introduction of protectionist measures in the 1930s.  On few things are 
economists and political scientists so agreed than that bilateral trade deals are sub-optimal 
and pose major threats to the multilateral trading system.  This is especially so when, as in the 
current context, they offered to advance non-trade specific agendas 
 
Actions, rather than rhetoric, suggest that the USA currently attaches as much, if not more, 
importance to its bilateral deals that have moved, and continue to move quickly with a range 
of countries, including Chile, Australian, Singapore, Morocco and a range of the smaller 
Latin American states, amongst others, as it does to conclusion of an acceptable MTN round.  
In its defence, when it chooses to give one, the current US administration argues that is 
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merely using its bilateral strategy to build, what USTR Robert Zoellick calls, a ‘coalition of 
liberalisers, placing the US at the heart of a network of initiatives to open markets’.  But it 
also appears that there is a decidedly political element to the choice of partners in this 
process.  As Zoellick (see New Statesman, 23, June, 2003: 17) speaking at the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington has noted: 
 
‘A free trade agreement is not something that one has a right to.  It’s a privilege.  
But it is a privilege that must be earned via the support of US policy goals. … 
[The Bush administration] … expects cooperation—or better—on foreign policy 
and security issues’.   
 
By way of illustration, Zoellick noted that a free trade deal with New Zealand—given its 
historical ban on nuclear ship visits, a failure to support the war in Iraq—was unlikely.  It has 
also been made very clear by the US Embassy in Wellington that FTA discussions are not on 
the agenda and that NZ’s negative attitude towards US security policy is a key factor in the 
US position. (‘US Toughens Trade Stance’, New Zealand Herald, May 24, 2003.) By 
contrast, the FTA with Australia has, since the end of the war in Iraq, been ‘fast tracked’.  
Political considerations are as important as economic ones in the development of bilateral 
trading agreements.  Symbolically, Singapore a strong coalition supporter had its FTA signed 
in the White House with due dispatch.  Chile, a near neighbour, had the signing of its 
agreement, the negotiations for which had begun prior to those with Singapore, delayed three 
months and signed in Miami!   
 
Of course, it does, as they say, take two to tango and such bilateral free trade deals 
undoubtedly prove popular to the policy elites of the small states that are offered them.3  
Australia and Singapore, as but two examples among many have, been keen partners in this 
process.  But bilateral PTAs represent a cheap and easy process by which the USA secures 
trade concessions or political support in other areas, in what are invariably and self-evidently 
asymmetrical negotiations and bargains. The rewards for the junior partners—rather than 
securing substantial economic gain—should perhaps be seen, somewhat paradoxically, more 
as exercise sovereignty enhancement and good publicity for the political leaders securing 
                                                
3 An articulate defence of FTAs is to be found in Desker (2003). 
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them.  Needless to say, FTAs are resolutely defended by the governments of the small 
partners.   
 
The Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, sees his country’s FTA with the US as 
having a strategic significance as a way of ‘embedding the US in East Asian regionalism’ 
(Asia Inc, August 2003: 10).  The Singapore-US FTA also had the happy coincidence of 
reflecting both countries desire to manage the role of China in the East Asian region.  Indeed, 
it is widely understood in Washington foreign policy circles that one element of an interest in 
bilateral PTAs in Asia reflects a desire on the part of the Bush Administration to contain what 
it sees, as the rising politico-economic influence of China in the region.4 
 
Given the interest of the Bush Administration in the Free Trade Agreement of the America‘s 
(itself a massive PTA) it is no surprise that, since 2000, there has been an increase in the 
tempo of bilateral negotiations in other parts of the world. From January 1995 to December 
1999 alone 69 new regional trade agreements were notified to the WTO Sapir, 2000:1135).  
Including previously existing arrangements, 113 were in power at the end of 1999. These 
figures do not include regional agreements still in negotiation stages and yet to be notified to 
the WTO.   Nor do they reflect developments in East Asia (see Table 1).   
 
                                                
4 I owe this point to a discussion with Professor Iain Johnstone. 
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Table 1 
The Status of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Negotiations in East Asia 
 
 Participating Countries Effective since/status 
1 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 28 January 1992 
2 ASEAN-China Negotiations to be completed by 2010 
3 ASEAN-EU Proposal 
4 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Negotiations 
5 ASEAN-Japan Proposal 
6 ASEAN-South Korea Proposal 
7 ASEAN-India Proposal 
8 Australia – New Zealand 1 January 1983, 1989 for services 
9 Australia-Papua New Guinea (PATCRA) 1 February 1977 
10 Australia-Japan Proposal 
11 Australia-Singapore Agreement signed 
12 Australia-South Korea Proposal 
13 Australia-Thailand Negotiations 
14 Australia-USA Proposal 
15 Canada-Mexico-USA (NAFTA) 1 April 1994 
16 Canada-Chile 5 July 1997 
17 Canada-Japan Proposal 
18 Canada-Singapore Negotiations 
19 China-Malaysia Proposal 
20 Chile-Mexico 1 August 1999 
21 Chile-New Zealand Negotiations 
22 Chile-Japan Proposal 
23 Chile-Singapore Proposal 
24 Chile-South Korea Agreements signed 
25 Chile-USA Negotiations completed 
26 Hong Kong-New Zealand Negotiations 
27 Indonesia-USA Proposal 
28 Japan-Malaysia Proposal 
29 Japan-Mexico Negotiations 
30 Japan-New Zealand Proposal 
31 Japan-Philippines Proposal 
32 Japan-Singapore Agreement signed 
33 Japan-South Korea Proposal 
34 Japan-Taiwan Proposal 
35 Japan-Thailand Proposal 
36 Malaysia-USA Proposal 
37 Mexico-South Korea Negotiations 
38 Mexico-Singapore Negotiations 
39 New Zealand-Singapore 1 January 2001 
40 New Zealand-South Korea Proposal 
41 New Zealand-Thailand Proposal 
42 New Zealand-USA Proposal 
43 Philippines-USA Proposal 
44 Singapore-South Korea Proposal 
45 Singapore-Taiwan Proposal 
46 Singapore-USA Agreement signed 
47 South Korea-Thailand Proposal 
48 South Korea-USA Proposal 
49 Taiwan-USA Proposal 
50 Vietnam-USA Trade agreement, not a complete FTA 
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I am not, of course, suggesting US policy is the only reason for this trend.  There is a regional 
interest in bilateral agreements, reflecting disillusionment with APEC and concern over the 
agenda of the Doha MTN.  More specifically, bilateral trade arrangements are felt to give 
regional policy elites greater control over national trade policies, reflecting the concern that 
their influence over deliberations within the context of the WTO are not always as significant 
as they would wish. As such, bilateral free trade agreements are statements of sovereignty.  
Thus, while the US may see bilateral agreements as a as a way of bolstering or rewarding 
good partners in the fight against terrorism, East Asian leaders also see them as a useful 
policy tool.  
 
The degree to which bilateral free trade agreements, or other forms of PTAs, are sub-optimal 
in comparison to the multilateral freeing of trade is well explained in the theoretical literature.  
PTAs, in the language of Fred Hirsch (1977), should be seen as ‘positional goods’.  Their 
value stems from the fact that they are, in theory at least, in limited supply.  The problem of 
course is that the impetus for the creation of PTAs is growing.  Should they proliferate—as 
the contemporary frenzy about them suggests they might—then the gains to the smaller 
players are diminished.  Consider the following analogy.  A spectator on the terraces at a 
football match stands on tiptoes in order to see better.  Should every other spectator do the 
same then any gain is dissipated.  This is the long-term dilemma of the proliferation of PTAs.  
They are only advantageous to those who have them whilst most others do not.  It is to this 
extent that they are sub-optimal to the overall health of the multilateral trading system.  They 
undermine the principle of the level playing field that gives free trade its legitimacy. 
 
Thus the important question is why sound economic theory does not automatically lead to 
good public policy?  The answer, that most economic theorists miss, or rather choose to 
ignore, is that good economic theory is often bad politics.  Paul Krugman, Dani Rodrik and 
Jagdish Bhagwati are notable exceptions here (see for example, Bhagwati, 2002). Policy 
makers are prepared to engage in uncoordinated bilateral decision-making—often leading to 
inferior outcomes (especially asymmetrical bargains for weaker states)—to create an illusion 
of control over one’s own policy processes and policy choices.  But as is well understood in 
the theoretical literature this is not the case.  It does in fact weaken the bargaining powers of 
poor countries in the MTN round (Bhagwati, 2002). Bilateral deals fragment, or prevent the 
development of, coalitions of developing countries as they abandon principle for small 
concessions from the powerful partner. 
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‘Trade liberalisation is becoming a sham, the ultimate objective  … (of the US) …  
being the capture, reshaping and distortion of the WTO in the image of American 
lobbying interests.  …  Thanks to the myopic and self-serving policies of the 
world’s only superpower, bilateral free trade agreements are damaging the global 
trading system.’ Bhagwati and Pangagirya, 2003: 13) 
 
Moreover, East Asian co-operation, in the both the economic and security domains, and the 
search for a new voice of Asian regionalism in the consolidation of the APT remains 
problematic.  The nascent nature of regional cooperation, when accompanied by the fear of 
being on the receiving end of asymmetrical agreements in times of low trust in the 
multilateral trading system, sees governments developing bilateral strategies. The discussion 
of PTAs is thus about regional states positioning themselves on a firmer bilateral basis in 
their relations with the USA. This is not, surprising. For most states of the region, the US is 
still the major bilateral relationship in both the economic and security domain.  
 
Of course, all states pursue a multidimensional economic policies (bilateral, regional and 
multilateral) but the important point here is that a strong US use of the bilateral PTA, as 
reward for support of wider policy issues, is a reflection of the linking of the economics-
security nexus that I call the ‘securitisation’ of foreign economic policy.  In a regional context 
it also reinforces a hub and spoke process of economic dialogue. 
 
Conclusion: A Problematic Future for US Foreign Policy? 
 
Let me conclude by outlining some of the implications of the argument that I have developed 
in the substantive sections of this paper.  I start with a brief consideration of a major 
contradiction in current US general strategy before considering if and how things might 
change and what all this might mean for the East Asian region.   
 
The Paradox of Liberal Unilateralist Internationalism 
 
Stripped of its essentials, the purpose of current American strategy seems to be to use its 
military, technical, and what it believes to be its moral, superiority, to advance a very specific 
view of liberalism and freedom.  As any undergraduate major in political philosophy would 
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know, the simple and universal view of freedom espoused by the neo-conservative idealists 
currently driving US foreign policy is rarely reflected in political practice.  Moreover, and 
without elaboration, the ideas of liberalism and freedom to be found in large pockets of the 
American right is alien to that which exists in many of the world’s other developed 
democracies, and indeed also within significant streams of political thinking within the 
United States (see Wolfe and Hittinger, 1994; Foner, 1998 and Richardson, 2001).   
 
Contrary to the manner in which ideas of liberalism and freedom are articulated by the neo-
conservatives around the Bush Administration, these are contested concepts, not universal 
truths.  The Bush view of liberalism assumes that it has universalist properties, and does so at 
the very time when many traditionally significant proponents of liberalism are abandoning 
this conceit.  Contrast John Gray’s (1996: x) earlier view of the centrality of universalism to 
liberalism with his later argument that liberal ideas ‘ … are not embodiments of universal 
principles … but local understandings grounded in particular forms of common life’ (Gray, 
1977, 17, cited in Richardson, 2002, 3).  The Bush view takes no account of the fact that 
liberal norms embedded in the political cultures of many Western societies might not be 
similarly suited to societies with different philosophical and cultural underpinnings.  
 
 In essence the view of liberal freedom emanating from the contemporary neo-conservative 
community in the US is what Richardson calls ‘a single value concept of liberalism’.  It is 
this that sets it apart from more traditional and moderate and pluralist understanding of the 
concept (Richardson, 2002: 8-9).  The Bush view appears to represent a strange mix of Isaiah 
Berlin’s (1969) negative and positive views of liberty, with an emphasis on the right of the 
negative freedom to choose on the one hand, accompanied by a positive requirement to 
accept certain prescribed moral truths on the other. This is a self-contradictory theoretical 
position.   
 
But it is also, of more relevance to this paper on contemporary US foreign policy, one that 
presents us with a paradox.  In order for this complex view of freedom to be advanced 
globally, it requires deliberate acts of forceful intervention.  Its logic suggests that, if needs 
be, the rest of the world must be forced to be free.  Thus, an assumption of neo-liberal 
globalisation—that it was self-generating—needs to be reconsidered.  Rather than being self-
generating, now it must be defended, indeed advanced, by US power.   
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But, any decent reading of history will tell us that attempts by a hegemonic power to force its 
philosophy on others can be expected to undermine the political legitimacy of the cause it 
wishes to advance.  Moreover, even if liberalism did enjoy a universal acceptance in the USA 
there would be no reason for non-liberals elsewhere to accept it.  Not so, say the neo-
conservatives. This argument is merely the smart, semantic chicanery and scholasticism one 
would expect from academics.  As Rhodes notes:  
 
‘For the Bush Administration, there is no logical inconsistency between 
freedom and the requirement that the liberal alternative be selected since it is 
inconceivable that anyone, given the opportunity to choose, would freely 
choose any other option.’ (Rhodes, 2003: 144.) 
 
And as the National Security Strategy notes, ‘these values of freedom are right and true for 
every person, in every society’ (US Government, 2002: 1).  But, even in the most democratic 
of societies, alternative readings of the liberal tradition, let alone non-liberal (by which I do 
not mean illiberal) readings, of how to organise society abound.   Liberalism, of any variant, 
and despite 1990s ‘Fukayama style’ assertions to the contrary, does not represent an end to 
history.  A forceful imposition of an American style liberal world order can be expected to—
indeed already does—generate seeds of opposition to its imposition. 
 
Moreover, it is now established how unthinking fundamentalist neo-liberal economic 
globalisation strategies of the 1980s-early 1990s (free market globalisation ‘naked in tooth 
and claw’) spawned the very opposition to it that developed in the latter part of the 1990s.  
Often generically, and crudely, referred to as the ‘anti-globalisation movement’, we now find, 
across the political spectrum, articulate and at times powerful groups and actors advancing 
counter positions against globalisation.  There seems to be neither logical reason, nor 
contemporary evidence, to assume that the aggressive securitisation of globalisation will not 
also have the effect of generating articulate, and eventually influential, points of resistance. 
 
Prospects for, and sources of, change in US Foreign Policy 
 
Moving from this brief critique to some of the more immediate implications set out in the 
paper, I have argued that the USA has securitised its foreign economic policy goals. This has 
had an impact on US attitudes and actions towards multilateral institutions, to which it has 
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become increasingly antithetical, and in the strengthening of bilateral elements of its foreign 
economic policy.  In so doing it has increased the gap between short-term security goals and 
longer-term requirements for international cooperation.  In addition, the short-term 
securitisation of foreign policy has marginalized the role of other actors—especially, the 
international institutions, global corporate America and civil society—in setting the agenda 
for, and propagating, US interests abroad. 
 
In the bilateral context, using US policy towards East Asia as a case study, I have identified 
the increasing interest in PTAs as an illustration of the securitisation of foreign economic 
policy.  While this growing regional interest in PTAs is driven by the US, I have not 
suggested that the US is overtly forcing states into these agreements.   Rather the agreements 
are offered as part of a strategy of inducement for support in other areas of foreign, especially 
security, policy and that these inducements have been greeted favourably by recipients.   
 
Finally, it has not been an aim of this paper to suggest a neo-conservative conspiracy.  
Rather, we have, as Robert Jervis nicely describes it, a situation in which:  
 
‘The forceful and unilateral exercise of US power is not simply the by-product of 
September 11, the Bush administration and some shadowy neo-conservative 
cabal—it is the logical outcome of the current unrivalled position of the US in the 
international system’ (Jervis, 2003: 84) 
 
So in this context the crucial policy question with which to conclude is: ‘what will bring 
about change in contemporary US foreign policy?’  What are the sources of such change 
likely to be?  This is a question for speculation rather than certainty.  I close, therefore, with a 
few speculations.  
 
While it is clear that there are non-state actors in the world that see the US as sufficiently 
malign to react to it in a violent way—especially Islamic terrorist groups (of a fundamentalist 
variety such as Al Qaeda or of a more specifically focussed and instrumentalist variety such 
as the Palestinian support groups)—most state actors in the world do not see the US in this 
way.  But most states—including usually strong supporters and alliance partners that have not 
been comfortable with US policy in recent years—have, nevertheless, felt sufficiently secure 
in the self-restraint of the US and its ability to maintain a level of commitment to the most 
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basic of international norms and institutional cooperation (Goh, 2002). In realist discourse, 
‘[t]he rise of a unipolar American order after the Cold War has not yet triggered a global 
backlash but it has unsettled relationships world wide’ (Ikenberry,  2002: 3)   
 
So why do many states, including a large number of allies, seem to put up with US policies 
with which they are not happy?  In short, because they believe that they need the US more 
than the US needs them.  Moreover, such is the nature of contemporary US power, that a 
traditional realist expectation about the inevitable move to ‘counter-balancing’ against the 
hegemon (see Waltz, 1979) does not seem a strong proposition in the early 21st century.  The 
least likely factor to affect change in US policy at the moment is the prospect of the 
development of some organised and counter-veiling ideas system, and accompanying 
concerted action, from other parts of the international system.  Thus, a realist understanding 
of power balancing does not offer us much immediate purchase on contemporary events.   
Europe does not have a common intellectual position at the moment. The multilateral urge is 
stronger there, including in the UK, than any other tendency.  Moreover, the multilateral urge 
is probably stronger in Europe than it would be in the USA even with a multilateral 
internationalist minded US government of a Democratic persuasion.  It is also true to say that 
there are those in Europe, and not just the French, who would want to balance against the 
USA.  But it is too much to expect that this will happen in any meaningful way in the short to 
medium term.  There is a substantial difference between intellectual aspirations and concerted 
material capability.   Similarly, Russia’s growing rapprochement with China, embodied in the 
2001 Formal Treaty of Friendship, is not the basis for the beginnings of a counter balancing 
exercise against the USA. 
Asia too is unlikely to provide a source of balancing against the USA.  It is only in the early 
stages of building a regional consensus on a range of policy issues.  At best, this consensus is 
fragile and has limited aspiration in both the economic and the security domain.  Moreover, 
the strength of the US bilateral presence in the foreign policies of most states of the region—
and the return to a hub and spoke strategy in both its economic and security relations the 
region—suggest that a concerted and uniform Asian position vis-a-vis the US is extremely 
unlikely. For the states of the region good bilateral ties with the USA, rather than stronger 
regional institutional cooperation, remains the preferred option.   
 35
The US is still the major economic partner for most significant states in the region and the 
greatest guarantor of security in the context of a rising Chinese presence in the region.  This 
may not always be the case.  While it cannot be discussed here, the prospect of building 
strong East Asian support for regional multilateralism represents, to my mind at least, one of 
the most interesting lines of scholarly and policy inquiry for the early decades of the 21st 
century (see Dieter and Higgott, 2003). If China, in the longer term, comes to be seen as an 
economic opportunity, rather than just a security threat, things could change.  China is the 
one state that could replace the USA as an alternative consumer market to the USA for the 
producing states of the region.   
Collectively, the prospect of Asia and Europe balancing against the US, via the over-hyped 
ASEM process, remains—occasional rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding—a remote 
prospect.   Thus, in the short run, it makes more sense to look for change in US policy not 
coming from pressures in the international system rather than from within the US political 
system. The biggest challenge to the idealist-unilateralists will come from within the 
American domestic polity, 
This challenge could come from one of two directions.  In terms of my original schema (refer 
back to the matrix on page 10) it could come from a drift of influence from box 4 to box 3—
that is, from the idealist or what Peter Spiro (2000) calls the new (post) sovereigntists to the 
(isolationist) sovereigntists.  The debate between these two ‘ideas sets’ appears to be the 
strongest in the US at the moment.   The absence of an end game or exit strategy in Iraq, the 
failure to bring credible administrative order, and an increasing number of US casualties in 
Iraq—notwithstanding what we might call the ‘long haul’ rhetoric—could see atrophy at the 
unilateralist-idealist end of the unilateralist-idealist—unilateralist realist spectrum of thinking 
and influence in Washington, especially if it increasingly looks to be an electoral liability in 
the 2004 Presidential election.   
If this were to be the case a drift towards the unilateralist isolationists of Box 3 might appear 
a strong prospect.  The return of a Democrat Administration, would lead to a shift away from 
Box 4 (the internationalist idealists) in the matrix in the direction of either Box 1 (multilateral 
idealists) staffed by liberal iinternationalists, of the Joseph Nye variety or, perhaps more 
likely, Box 2 (the realist managers.)  In either event, we could expect a return to a more 
multilateral approach to US foreign policy.  This is not to suggest a return to the status quo 
ante the arrival of the Bush Administration. Rather, agreeing with Jervis (2003: 84), to 
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recognise that a continuation of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ is unlikely occur under a Democrat 
administration of any political stripe.   
But we should not make generalisations about US foreign policy, especially attitudes towards 
multilateral institutions, purely on the basis a reading of the Bush era alone.  Historical 
patterns present a more complex picture.  Let us not forget, the relationship between US 
foreign policy and multilateralism overtime has always been, as per the title of a recent book 
on the topic, an exercise in ‘Ambivalent Engagement’ (Patrick and Foreman, 2002).  Others 
would describe it as ‘instrumental multilateralism’ (Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno, 
1993).  Thus the longer-term prospects for a more cooperative and multilateral international 
order are less to do with traditional realist understandings of power balancing against a 
unipolar order moving in the direction of a multipolar order.   
Instead we should look to evidence of, and prospects for, the emergence of some shared ideas 
set amongst the world’s global policy community.  Notwithstanding the unipolar, and 
antagonistic nature of the contemporary era, these may not be in as short supply as might be 
assumed.  This might seem a naive argument to make given the current administration in 
Washington and while the neo-conservative intellectual community from which it draws its 
strength continues to have so much influence.  This Administration is so far out of kilter with 
the thinking political and policy elites of Europe and Asia—most of who would sit more 
comfortably with the US traditions to be found in either Box 1 or 2 than they would in 3 or 
4—that the essence of a shared community of ideas seems remote. Presently, shared 
understanding—built around multilateral governance structures—is not likely while the US 
policy community is dominated by the ideas of the unilateralist-idealists.   
But, the current historical rupture in thinking between Washington and other points of the 
global compass is so sharp that we are forgetting much of what we had learned in the post-
Cold War decade.  Prior to the rise to power of the neo-conservatives it was possible to argue, 
as did Thomas Risse (2002) that a degree of trust and loyalty amongst the ruling policy 
communities of western states could be seen.  Such was the degree of this trust that even 
serious conflicts (over trade, for example) did not threaten the ability of the wider structure of 
institutions and shared expectations to contain them.  It is because the ideological position 
and behaviour of the neo-conservatives is so far to the end of the curve, that trust in the US to 
use of its power responsibly, in what Risse calls a ‘liberal security community’, appears to be 
waning. 
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Thus, the degree to which a new ideas battle with the US will emerge—and perhaps more 
importantly, the manner in which that battle will be conducted—will depend very much on 
the manner in which the US conducts its foreign policy over the coming years.  We are at a 
stage where history actually offers us little by way of lesson learning. The late Susan Strange, 
like the distinguished economist, Charles Kindleberger, felt that on balance the US in the 19th 
and 20th had been an ‘altruistic hegemon’ delivering multilateral public goods (See Strange, 
1985). Today as Bhagwati and Panagariya argue (2003: 13) ‘we have a “selfish hegemon” 
precisely delivering the opposite’.   
If we are at the high water mark of the unilateral moment, and some sense of commitment to 
multilateral cooperation and agendas geared to underwriting global public goods, even if only 
comparable to those that existed prior to the Bush administration, can be regained, then a 
constructive reformist international dialogue about the management of the 21st century liberal 
global economic order might be possible (for the contours of such a scenario see Brassett and 
Higgott, 2004). forthcoming).  But, if we are at the beginning of a policy process in which the 
continued unilateralisation and securitisation of US foreign policy is set to continue—as some 
such as Kagan, (2003) and what Pfaff (2003: 10) calls ‘the sentimental Wilsonian utopians’ 
believe—then the gap in the ideas system between the US and its major European and, indeed 
Asian, partners looks set to grow. 
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